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MESSAGE FROM THE TASK FORCE CO-CHAIRS 
We are pleased to present the Preliminary Report on Race and 
Washington’s Criminal Justice System, authored by the Research 
Working Group of the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System. The Research Working Group’s mandate was to investigate 
disproportionalities in the criminal justice system and, where 
disproportionalities existed, to investigate possible causes. This fact-
based inquiry was designed to serve as a basis for making 
recommendations for changes to promote fairness, reduce disparity, 
ensure legitimate public safety objectives, and instill public confidence 
in our criminal justice system. 
The Task Force came into being after a group of us met to discuss 
remarks on race and crime reportedly made by two sitting justices on the 
Washington State Supreme Court. This first meeting was attended by 
representatives from the Washington State Bar Association, the 
Washington State Access to Justice Board, the commissions on Minority 
and Justice and Gender and Justice, all three Washington law schools, 
leaders from nearly all of the state’s specialty bar associations, and other 
leaders from the community and the bar. 
We agreed that we shared a commitment to ensure fairness in the 
criminal justice system. We developed working groups, including the 
Research Working Group, whose Preliminary Report finds that race and 
racial bias affect outcomes in the criminal justice system and matter in 
ways that are not fair, that do not advance legitimate public safety 
objectives, and that undermine public confidence in our criminal justice 
system. 
All of our working groups—Oversight, Community Engagement, 
Research, Recommendations/Implementation, and Education—are 
coordinating together to develop solutions. We are fortunate to have the 
formal participation of a broad range of organizations and institutions, 
with each week bringing new participants. We also have many people 
contributing in an individual capacity, including many judges. 
We have come together to offer our time, our energy, our expertise, 
and our dedication to achieve fairness in our criminal justice system. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Steven C. González, 
Past Chair, Washington State Access to Justice Board 
Professor Robert S. Chang, 
Director, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality 
Co-Chairs, Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In 1980, of all states, Washington had the highest rate of 
disproportionate minority representation in its prisons.1 Today, minority 
racial and ethnic groups remain disproportionately represented in 
Washington State’s court, prison, and jail populations, relative to their 
share of the state’s general population.2 The fact of racial and ethnic 
disproportionality in our criminal justice system is indisputable. 
Our research focused on trying to answer why these 
disproportionalities exist. We examined differential commission rates, 
facially neutral policies with disparate impacts, and bias as possible 
contributing causes. 
We found that the assertion attributed to then-Justice Sanders of the 
Supreme Court of Washington that “African-Americans are 
overrepresented in the prison population because they commit a 
disproportionate number of crimes,”3 is a gross oversimplification. 
Studies of particular Washington State criminal justice practices and 
institutions find that race and ethnicity influence criminal justice 
outcomes over and above commission rates.4 Moreover, global 
assertions about differential crime commission rates are difficult to 
substantiate. Most crime victims do not report crimes and most criminal 
offenders are never arrested.5 We never truly know exact commission 
rates.6 Even if arrest rates are used as a proxy for underlying commission 
rates, 2009 data show that 45% of Washington’s imprisonment 
disproportionality cannot be accounted for by disproportionality at 
arrest.7 
We reviewed research that focused on particular areas of 
Washington’s criminal justice system and conclude that much of the 
                                                     
1. Scott Christianson, Corrections Law Developments: Racial Discrimination and Prison 
Confinement—A Follow-Up, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 616, 617 (1980). 
2. See discussion infra Part II. 
3. Steve Miletich, Two State Supreme Court Justices Stun Some Listeners with Race Comments, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2013226310_just
ices22m.html. 
4. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
5. See infra text accompanying note 91. 
6. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
7. Task Force researchers analyzed 2009 data obtained from the Washington State Association of 
Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, and then replicated the commission versus disparity figure, originally 
compiled by Crutchfield et al., and found that 55% of the black-white disproportionality in 
imprisonment rates is attributable to index crime arrest rates. In other words, 45% of the racial 
disproportionality in imprisonment cannot be explained by and is not attributable to racial 
differences in arrest rates. See discussion infra Part III.A.  
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disproportionality is explained by facially neutral policies that have 
racially disparate effects. For the areas, agencies, and time periods that 
were studied, the following disparities were found: 
 Youth of color in the juvenile justice system face harsher 
sentencing outcomes than similarly situated white youth, as 
well as disparate treatment by probation officers.8 
 Defendants of color were significantly less likely than 
similarly situated white defendants to receive sentences that 
fell below the standard range.9 
 Among felony drug offenders, black defendants were 62% 
more likely to be sentenced to prison than similarly situated 
white defendants.10 
 With regard to legal financial obligations,11 similarly situated 
Latino defendants receive significantly greater legal financial 
obligations than their white counterparts.12 
 Disparate treatment exists in the context of pretrial release 
decisions, which systematically disfavors minority 
defendants.13 
 In Seattle, the black arrest rate for delivery of a drug other 
than marijuana is twenty-one times higher than the white 
arrest rate for that offense, one of the highest levels of 
disparity found across the country.14 Research suggests that 
this disparity does not primarily reflect different levels of 
involvement with illicit drugs.15 
                                                     
8. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile 
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554, 567 (1998); 
see also discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
9. ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH. STATE 
SUPREME COURT, RACIAL/ETHNIC DISPARITIES AND EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCES IN WASHINGTON 
STATE 72 tbl.13B (1993), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/1993SeptRacia%20EthnicDisparitiesReport.pdf; see also 
discussion infra Part III.B.2. But see CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., supra, at 72 tbl.13A (showing that 
whites were significantly more likely than blacks to receive sentences above the standard range). 
10. Sara Steen et al., Images of Danger and Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing, 
and Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 435, 451 (2005); see also discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
11. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.94A.760 (Supp. 2011) (defining a legal financial obligation and 
when it may be imposed). 
12. See discussion infra Part III.B.4. 
13. See discussion infra Part III.B.5. 
14. KATHERINE BECKETT, RACE AND DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SEATTLE 56 tbl.10, 57 
(2008), available at 
http://faculty.washington.edu/kbeckett/Race%20and%20Drug%20Law%20Enforcement%20in%20
Seattle_2008.pdf. 
15. See discussion infra Part III.B.6. 
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 Minority drivers are more likely to be searched by the 
Washington State Patrol than white motorists, although the 
rate at which searches result in seizures is highest for 
whites.16 
In all of these areas, facially neutral policies result in disparate treatment 
of minorities over time. 
Implicit and explicit racial bias also contributes to this 
disproportionality by influencing decision-making within the criminal 
justice system.17 Race and racial stereotypes play a role in the judgments 
and decision-making of human actors within the criminal justice system. 
The influence of such bias is subtle and often undetectable in any given 
case, but its effects are significant, cumulative, and observable over 
time.18 When policymakers determine policy, when official actors 
exercise discretion, and when citizens proffer testimony or jury service, 
bias often plays a role.19 
To summarize: 
 We find the assertion that the overrepresentation of black 
people in the Washington State prison system is due solely to 
differential crime commission rates inaccurate. 
 We find that facially race-neutral policies that have a 
disparate impact on people of color contribute significantly to 
disparities in the criminal justice system. 
 We find that racial and ethnic bias distorts decision-making at 
various stages in the criminal justice system, contributing to 
disparities. 
 We find that race and racial bias matter in ways that are not 
fair, that do not advance legitimate public safety objectives, 
that produce disparities in the criminal justice system, and 
that undermine public confidence in our legal system. 
                                                     
16. See discussion infra Part III.B.8. 
17. See, e.g., Robin S. Engel & Richard Johnson, Toward a Better Understanding of Racial and 
Ethnic Disparities in Search and Seizure Rates, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 605, 611–12 (2006); Sandra 
Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 
28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 487, 499 (2004); Richard R. Johnson, Race and Police Reliance on 
Suspicious Non-Verbal Cues, 30 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 277, 280, 286–
87 (2007); Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race, 
Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors: A 
Meta-Analysis, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315, 1333 (1994); Laura T. Sweeney & Craig 
Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Studies, 10 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 179, 192–93 (1992). 
18. See Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation 
Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 729, 729–30 (2000). 
19. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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DEFINITIONS 
What We Mean by “Disproportionality” and “Disparity” 
Although the terms disproportionality and disparity often are used 
interchangeably, there is an important distinction between these two 
concepts. We have found it useful to distinguish between racial 
inequities that result from differential crime commission rates and racial 
inequities that result from practices or policies. In this Report, we use 
“disproportionality” to refer to a discrepancy between reference groups’ 
representation in the general population and in criminal justice 
institutions. In contrast, we use “disparity” when similarly situated 
groups of individuals are treated differently within those institutions, or 
to refer to overrepresentation of particular groups in the criminal justice 
system that stems from criminal justice practices or policies. 
What We Mean by “Imprisonment” and “Incarceration” 
Imprisonment refers to being held in state prisons. Incarceration refers 
to being held in state prisons or local jails. Many local jails do not 
collect and report on ethnicity, i.e., whether someone is Latino or of 
Hispanic origin. 
What We Mean by “Rate” and “Ratio” 
When discussing incarceration or imprisonment (as well as other 
aspects of the criminal justice system), we often discuss the rate of 
incarceration or imprisonment in comparison to a particular population. 
Thus, the white incarceration rate is measured by taking the number of 
whites incarcerated, dividing it by the number of whites in the general 
population, and then multiplying by 100,000 to determine the number of 
whites incarcerated per 100,000 whites in the general population. To 
compare black and white incarceration, we take the black incarceration 
rate and divide it by the white incarceration rate—a ratio that provides a 
useful measure of comparison. 
What We Mean by “Race” and “Ethnicity” 
An inherent problem with race is that not many understand what 
“race” means. Widely accepted understandings of race focus on biology, 
invariably pointing to physical differences among humans that are used 
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to define, in genetic terms, different racial groups.20 The distinctions that 
we employ today to categorize humans, such as black, white, and Latino, 
date back only a few centuries or less.21 These labels do not signal 
genetically separate branches of humankind, for there is only one human 
race; no other biological race of humanity exists. Racial distinctions are 
largely social constructs based upon perception and history.22 
Not only are these distinctions socially constructed, but they are also 
in constant flux and under perpetual siege by those who dispute the 
arbitrary lines that they draw.23 The problem is compounded by the fact 
that different institutions use the terms differently. This lack of common 
nomenclature makes some comparisons difficult. When a term like 
“Asian” may encompass over two billion individuals, its ability to 
precisely and accurately describe an individual, much less a group of 
individuals, becomes challenging. Similar difficulties imperil the 
classifications of “Hispanic” and “Latino,” which are used to describe 
not only Dominicans whose descendants may be from Africa,24 but also 
Argentines whose ancestry may be traced to Italy,25 and Peruvians 
whose forefathers may have emigrated from Japan.26 Additionally, these 
traditional categories have come under increasing strain because one in 
seven marriages within the United States is now “interracial” or 
“interethnic,” rendering single labels less accurate.27 
In this Report, we use “race” to refer to groups of people loosely 
bound together by history, ancestry, and socially significant elements of 
their physical appearance. For instance, when using the term 
“Latina/o”—which we will use where possible rather than “Hispanic”—
we mean to describe those individuals whose ancestry is traced back to 
Latin America, Spain, and Portugal. This definition contemplates race 
                                                     
20. Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994). 
21. Id. at 7–8. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Benjamin Bailey, Dominican-American Ethnic/Racial Identities and United States Social 
Categories, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 677, 677–78 (2001) (“The majority of Dominicans have 
sub-Saharan African ancestry, which would make them ‘black’ by historical United States ‘one-
drop’ rules.” (footnote omitted)). 
25. See Samuel L. Baily, Chain Migration of Italians to Argentina: Case Studies of the Agnonesi 
and the Sirolesi, STUDI EMIGRAZIONE, Mar. 1982, at 73, 75–76. 
26. See J. F. NORMANO & ANTONELLO GERBI, THE JAPANESE IN SOUTH AMERICA 3–4 (1943). 
27. Susan Saulny, Counting by Race Can Throw off Some Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/us/10count.html?scp=1&sq=race%20count
ing&st=cse. 
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and ethnicity as social phenomena, wherein certain characteristics (i.e., 
history and morphology) are given meanings by society. In this way, 
race and ethnicity are not objective observations rooted in biology, but 
rather self-reinforcing processes rooted in the daily decisions we make 
as individuals and as institutions. Although socially constructed and 
enacted, race and ethnicity have important consequences for people’s 
lived experiences. 
What We Mean by “Structural Racism” 
A structurally racist system can be understood best as a system in 
which a society’s institutions are embedded with a network of policies 
and practices that, overtly or subtly, advantage one racial group over 
another, thereby facilitating racially disparate outcomes. Within such 
systems, notions and stereotypes about race and ethnicity shape actors’ 
identities, beliefs, attitudes, and value orientations.28 In turn, individuals 
interact and behave in ways that reinforce these stereotypes. Thus, even 
with facially race-neutral policies, implementation decisions are 
informed by actors’ understandings (or lack thereof) about race and 
ethnicity, often leading to disparities in treatment of people of color. As 
a consequence, structural racism produces cumulative and persistent 
racial and ethnic inequalities.29 
Racism should not be viewed as an ideology or an orientation toward 
a certain group but instead as a system: “[A]fter a society becomes 
racialized, racialization develops a life of its own. Although it interacts 
with class and gender structurations in the social system, it becomes an 
organizing principle of social relations itself.”30 The persistent inequality 
experienced by blacks and other people of color in America is, in part, 
the result of this racial structure.31 The contemporary racial structure is 
distinct from that of the past in that it is covert, is embedded within the 
regular practices of institutions, does not rely on a racial vocabulary, and 
is invisible to most whites.32 
 
                                                     
28. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation, 62 AM. SOC. 
REV. 465, 475–76 (1997). 
29. Id. at 475. 
30. Id. 
31. Id.  
32. Id. at 467. 
04 - WLR March 2012 Task Force Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012 11:17 AM 
SEATTLE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
10 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:1 
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Washington State has a mixed history when it comes to its treatment 
of racial and ethnic minorities. It was founded through the displacement 
of its native peoples by legal and extralegal means.33 Washington’s early 
history included severe anti-immigrant sentiment expressed first toward 
Chinese immigrants34 and then Japanese immigrants, who were the 
target of the state’s Alien Land Laws.35 Yet unlike other states that 
instituted de jure segregation of schools and severely limited 
participation in the legal system,36 Washington did not mandate school 
segregation by law and was the only western state that did not ban 
interracial marriage.37 In fact, Washington became so well known for its 
openness that interracial couples would often travel to the state solely to 
get married.38 A ready coalition of four distinct racial minorities—
blacks, Chinese, Filipinos, and Japanese—worked together during the 
1930s to defeat various policies that targeted racial minorities.39 These 
                                                     
33. See generally 31 HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF WASHINGTON, IDAHO, AND 
MONTANA 1845–1889 (S.F., The History Co. 1890).  
34. See, e.g., DOUG CHIN, SEATTLE’S INTERNATIONAL DISTRICT: THE MAKING OF A PAN-ASIAN 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 22 (2001) (documenting the 1886 attempted forcible removal of 350 
Chinese immigrants from Seattle); ROGER DANIELS, ASIAN AMERICA: CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN 
THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1850, at 59–60 (1988) (documenting the forcible removal of Chinese 
from Tacoma throughout 1885 and 1886). 
35. See Mark L. Lazarus III, An Historical Analysis of Alien Land Law: Washington Territory & 
State 1853–1889, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 197, 235–36 (1989). 
36. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8003, 8004 (Deering 1944) (repealed 1947) (authorizing the 
segregation of children of Chinese, Japanese, or Mongolian parentage, and Indians under certain 
circumstances); People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (interpreting a statute that excluded “Blacks” and 
“Indians” from testifying against white defendants, and classifying Chinese persons as either 
“Indian” or “Black” in order to exclude the testimony of a Chinese witness against the white 
defendant). 
37. Stefanie Johnson, Blocking Racial Intermarriage Laws in 1935 and 1937: Seattle’s First Civil 
Rights Coalition, SEATTLE C.R. & LAB. HIST. PROJECT (2005), 
http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/antimiscegenation.htm. The Washington Territory, however, did 
ban interracial marriage from 1866 to 1868. Act of Jan. 20, 1866, § 2(3), 1865–1866 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 80, 81 (“Marriages . . . are prohibited . . . [w]hen either of the parties is a white person and the 
other a negro or Indian, or a person of one-half or more negro or Indian blood.”), repealed by Act of 
Jan. 23, 1868, § 1, 1867–1868 Wash. Sess. Laws 47, 47-48; Act of Jan. 29, 1855, § 1, 1854–1855 
Wash. Sess. Laws 33, 33 (“[A]ll marriages heretofore solemnized in this territory, where one of the 
parties to such marriage shall be a white person, and the other possessed of one-fourth or more 
negro blood, or more than one-half Indian blood, are hereby declared void.”). 
38. RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 
342 (1989). 
39. Johnson, supra note 37 (“Four distinct racial minorities—blacks, Filipinos, Japanese, and 
Chinese—dominated the Seattle’s [sic] civil rights politics over the 1930s, and each group brought 
something different to the political table . . . .”). 
04 - WLR March 2012 Task Force Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012 11:17 AM 
2012] RACE & WASHINGTON’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 
 
initial campaigns laid the groundwork for future collaboration that 
would cut across racial lines.40 
Despite this coalition, troubling manifestations of racial 
discrimination in the public and private spheres continued, 
demonstrating that Washington State was hardly immune to racial bias. 
For instance, in March 1942, 14,400 persons of Japanese descent lived in 
Washington State, including 9600 in King County alone.41 Of these, 
nearly 13,000 were incarcerated and placed into internment camps.42 
Over 30% of those forcibly removed from Seattle never returned to their 
homes.43 After World War II, Seattle’s black population experienced its 
own backlash, as restrictive covenants and other forms of housing 
discrimination proliferated throughout Washington State between 1940 
and 1960.44 These covenants were so effective in Seattle that they 
functionally concentrated 78% of the black community into the area 
known as the “Central District.”45 While residential discrimination is no 
longer sanctioned by the law, its effects continue to reverberate even 
today.46 
Even after Japanese American incarceration ended and residential 
discrimination became less overt, one area continued to produce 
racialized outcomes: the criminal justice system. In 1980, scholar Scott 
Christianson published findings showing that Washington State led the 
nation in disproportionate imprisonment of blacks.47 While every state 
disproportionately imprisoned blacks, the overrepresentation of blacks 
relative to the size of the black population was greatest in Washington.48 
In a 2005 report discussing Christianson’s finding, Robert Crutchfield 
found that while blacks in 1980 constituted approximately 28% of the 
prison population, they constituted approximately 3% of the general 
                                                     
40. Id. (“The 1935 and 1937 campaigns laid the groundwork for future multi-ethnic collaboration 
on subsequent civil rights and progressive issues.”). 
41. DAVID A. TAKAMI, DIVIDED DESTINY: A HISTORY OF JAPANESE AMERICANS IN SEATTLE 46 
(1998). 
42. Id. at 50. 
43. Robert S. Chang & Catherine E. Smith, John Calmore’s America, 86 N.C. L. REV. 739, 748–
49 (2008). 
44. QUINTARD TAYLOR, THE FORGING OF A BLACK COMMUNITY: SEATTLE’S CENTRAL DISTRICT 
FROM 1870 THROUGH THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 178–80 (1994). 
45. Id. at 179. 
46. Henry W. McGee, Jr., Seattle’s Central District, 1990–2006: Integration or Displacement?, 
39 URB. LAW. 167, 214–16 (2007). 
47. Christianson, supra note 1.  
48. Id. at 616. 
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population.49 The black share of the prison population was more than 
nine times greater than the black share of the general population.50 
Nationally, the black share of the prison population was four times 
greater than the black share of the general population.51 
Christianson’s findings sparked a firestorm of concern among 
policymakers, researchers, and citizens in Washington State.52 The state 
legislature responded by commissioning a study to determine whether 
racial disparity existed in Washington’s criminal justice system.53 The 
1986 Crutchfield and Bridges study was the first in a series of studies 
over the last twenty-five years to find that racial bias exists at various 
points in Washington’s criminal justice system.54 In particular, this first 
study found that race affects the processing of felony cases in 
Washington State, even after controlling for legally relevant factors.55 
That is, all things being equal, outcomes were worse for defendants who 
were black than for defendants who were white.56 
In the wake of the 1986 Crutchfield and Bridges report, the state 
legislature established the Washington State Minority and Justice Task 
Force to study “the treatment of minorities in the state court system, to 
recommend reforms and to provide an education program for the 
judiciary.”57 Among other findings, the 1990 report concluded that 
minorities perceive “that bias pervades the entire legal system in general 
and hence [minorities] do not trust the court system to resolve their 
disputes or administer justice evenhandedly.”58 In particular, this 
                                                     
49. See Exhibit 2: Declaration and Report of Robert D. Crutchfield, Ph.D. at 244–45, Farrakhan 





52. The Washington State Legislature began to focus on racial disproportionality within the 
criminal justice system after Christianson’s 1980 report came out. In response, the legislature 
commissioned the original Crutchfield and Bridges study of 1986, which spawned many of the other 
studies cited in this Report. Cumulatively, these studies make Washington one of the most, if not the 




55. GEORGE S. BRIDGES & ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD, INST. FOR PUB. POLICY & MGMT., UNIV. 
OF WASH., RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN IMPRISONMENT 26 (1986). 
56. Id. at 34. 
57. CHARLES Z. SMITH, WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE TASK FORCE, WASH. STATE 
SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT, at xxi (1990), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/TaskForce.pdf. 
58. Id. at 10. 
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perception of bias extended to criminal proceedings, where minorities 
reported that they received disparate treatment from prosecutors, law 
enforcement authorities, and public defenders.59 The report concluded 
that more research was needed to determine how race affects individual 
experiences with various aspects of Washington’s criminal justice 
system, such as pretrial release, bail, prosecutorial discretion, and quality 
of counsel.60 
Decades later, the perception that racial bias permeates the criminal 
justice system persists.61 But now there is substantial evidence to support 
the notion that racial inequities do permeate the criminal justice system. 
Subsequent studies commissioned since 1986 have confirmed that 
Washington cannot justify its disproportionate minority incarceration 
rates on the sole basis that minorities commit more crimes.62 For 
instance, the extant research concerning the Washington State Patrol 
suggests that race does not affect police discretion with regard to stops 
but does affect searches.63 Other research indicates that Seattle drug 
arrest patterns and outcomes are shaped by race.64 Another study found 
that even after controlling for legally relevant factors, racial differences 
                                                     
59. Id. at 25–33. 
60. Id. at 21–22. 
61. See, e.g., SAM PAILCA, OFFICE OF PROF’L ACCOUNTABILITY, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, 
REPORT ON SEATTLE’S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS ABOUT RACIALLY BIASED POLICING 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.seattle.gov/police/opa/Docs/BiasedPolicing.pdf (discussing the widespread 
perception that racial bias exists in law enforcement). 
62. See Exhibit 2: Declaration and Report of Robert D. Crutchfield, Ph.D., supra note 49, at 237–
40. 
63. See, e.g., NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH ET AL., DIV. OF GOV’TL STUDIES & SERVS., WASH. STATE 
UNIV., REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE PATROL 23, 42–43 (2007) [hereinafter LOVRICH ET 
AL., 2007 STUDY], available at http://www.wsp.wa.gov/publications/reports/wsu_2007_report.pdf 
(finding that police stops involving blacks, Native Americans, and Hispanics are more likely to 
result in searches); NICHOLAS P. LOVRICH ET AL., DIV. OF GOV’TL STUDIES & SERVS., WASH. 
STATE UNIV., ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC STOP DATA COLLECTED BY THE WASHINGTON STATE PATROL 
2 (2005), available at http://www.policeforum.org/library/racially-biased-policing/supplemental-
resources/wsu_2005_report[1].pdf (finding the same); NICHOLAS LOVRICH ET AL., DIV. OF GOV’TL 
STUDIES & SERVS., WASH. STATE UNIV., WSP TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS PROJECT REPORT 2–
3 (2003) [hereinafter LOVRICH ET AL., 2003 STUDY], available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.102.7223&rep=rep1&type=pdf (finding 
the same). 
64. Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug 
Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 119, 129 (2006) [hereinafter Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, 
and Policing] (concluding that racially disproportionate drug arrest rates in Seattle cannot be 
explained by comparing commission rates, but rather are the result of police practices that have a 
racially disparate impact); Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the 
Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 435–36 (2005) [hereinafter Beckett et 
al., Lessons from Seattle] (concluding the same). 
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affect how cases are processed: minorities were more likely than whites 
to be held in custody prior to trial, less likely than whites to be released 
on personal recognizance following arrest, and more likely to receive 
monetary bail.65 While these and other studies have focused on different 
decision-making points in the criminal justice system, one troubling 
conclusion, in particular, underlies each study’s findings: when it comes 
to Washington State’s criminal justice system, race matters. 
Given this state’s history and the evidence demonstrating the 
importance of race in the criminal justice system, members of the 
community were understandably concerned when two sitting 
Washington State Supreme Court Justices opined on October 7, 2010, 
that racial minorities are overrepresented in the prison population solely 
because they commit more crimes and not because any bias exists in the 
criminal justice system.66 The comments themselves betrayed a common 
misunderstanding about whether this issue is more complex than a 
cursory review of certain crime conviction rates might imply. Conviction 
rates are not a valid proxy for commission rates. 
In the wake of these comments, concerned community members came 
together to form the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System. We met because the simplistic notion that black 
overrepresentation in our prisons occurs because blacks commit more 
crimes did not fit with our sense of how racial and ethnic minorities are 
treated in today’s society and in our criminal justice system. We realized 
quickly, though, that it was important not to proceed on assumptions that 
unfair treatment existed. 
The Task Force divided into five working groups: Oversight, 
Community Engagement, Research, Recommendations/Implementation, 
and Education. The Research Working Group’s mandate was to 
investigate disproportionalities in the criminal justice system and, where 
disproportionalities existed, investigate possible causes. This fact-based 
inquiry was designed to serve as a basis for recommending changes that 
would promote fairness, reduce disparity, ensure legitimate public safety 
objectives, and instill public confidence in our criminal justice system. 
As we engaged in this work, the Research Working Group reported back 
to the broader Task Force. Our membership grew as more and more 
organizations and institutions recognized the importance of this issue, 
                                                     
65. GEORGE S. BRIDGES, WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH. STATE SUPREME 
COURT, A STUDY ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN SUPERIOR COURT BAIL AND PRE-TRIAL 
DETENTION PRACTICES IN WASHINGTON 52–53 (1997), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/pdf/1997_ResearchStudy.pdf. 
66. Miletich, supra note 3. 
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not just for the affected racial and ethnic groups, but also for the best 
aspirations we have as a state. One measure of the goodwill of the 
people of the State of Washington is the broad range of organizations 
and individuals who have joined the Task Force, for what all of us have 
come to realize is a multi-year project. 
For this Report, the Research Working Group reviewed evidence on 
disproportionality in Washington’s criminal justice system and 
considered whether crime commission rates accounted for this 
disproportionality. We found that crime commission rates by race and 
ethnicity are largely unknown and perhaps unknowable, but that some 
researchers simply take arrest rates as good proxies for underlying 
commission rates for all crimes.67 We found that use of arrest rates likely 
overstates black crime commission rates for several reasons.68 But even 
if arrest rates are used as a proxy for underlying crime commission rates, 
the extent of racial disproportionality is not explained by commission 
rates. In 1982, 80% of black imprisonment in Washington for serious 
crimes could not be accounted for based on arrest rates, though by 2009, 
this had dropped to 45%.69 
We then identified and synthesized research on nine issues for which 
evidence exists regarding the causes of Washington’s disproportionality: 
(1) juvenile justice; (2) prosecutorial decision-making; (3) sentencing 
outcomes; (4) legal financial obligations (“LFOs”); (5) pretrial release; 
(6) drug enforcement; (7) asset forfeiture; (8) traffic enforcement; and 
(9) prosecution for Driving While License Suspended (“DWLS”). In 
each of these areas, the research, data, and findings pertain specifically 
to Washington State.70 
We also reviewed research regarding bias, especially research on 
unconscious or implicit bias. We found that cognitive neuroscience and 
social psychology help us to better understand the existence and 
behavioral consequences of unconscious or implicit racism.71 
                                                     
67. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of United States’ Prison 
Populations, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1264 (1982). 
68. For instance, because most black victims identify their assailants as black, and because black 
victims have a higher reporting rate generally, crimes involving black suspects are more likely to 
receive police attention. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
69. Robert D. Crutchfield et al., Analytical and Aggregation Biases in Analyses of Imprisonment: 
Reconciling Discrepancies in Studies of Racial Disparity, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 166, 179 
(1994); see also discussion infra Part III.A. 
70. The informational resources and preliminary findings were made available to the 
Recommendations and Implementation Working Group to help inform their policy 
recommendations. 
71. See, e.g., Phelps et al., supra note 18. 
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The evidence we gathered demonstrates that within Washington 
State’s criminal justice system, race and ethnicity matter in ways that are 
inconsistent with fairness, that do not advance legitimate public safety 
objectives, and that undermine public confidence. 
Part II presents the Working Group’s findings and data regarding 
racial disproportionality within Washington State’s criminal justice 
system. Part III discusses three possible causes for this 
disproportionality. Part III.A discusses differential commission rates, 
concluding that this factor alone cannot account for the 
disproportionality observed in the criminal justice system. Part III.B 
discusses seven racially neutral policies that have racially disparate 
effects, and thus help explain racial disproportionality. Finally, Part III.C 
discusses bias, whether explicit or implicit, and how it produces racial 
disparity. 
II.  RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY WITHIN WASHINGTON 
STATE’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
For context, we note that the United States has the highest 
incarceration rate of any country in the world, more than twice as great 
as the two Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
countries with the next highest rates (Chile and Israel), more than six 
times that of Canada, nearly four times that of Mexico, and nearly five 
times as great as the United Kingdom.72 Within the United States, the 
high incarceration rate is disproportionately experienced by certain racial 
and ethnic groups, with whites incarcerated at a rate of 412 per 100,000 
white residents, blacks incarcerated at a rate of 2290 per 100,000 black 
residents, and Latinos incarcerated at a rate of 742 per 100,000 Latino 
residents.73 In the United States, drawing from 2005 data, blacks are 




                                                     
72. World Prison Brief, Entire World—Prison Population Rates per 100,000 of the National 
Population, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/ 
worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate (last visited Dec. 30, 2011). An OECD 
country is one that participates in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
whose purpose is to coordinate policy among certain developed countries. 
73. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES 
OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 4 tbl.1 (2007), available at 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_stateratesofincbyraceandethnicity.pdf. 
74. Id. at 3. 
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TABLE 1: PRISON AND JAIL INCARCERATION RATES AND RATIOS, 
2005, UNITED STATES75 
 Incarceration rate 
(per 100,000) 
Disproportionality ratio 
(in comparison to 
White) 
White 412 n/a 
Black 2290 5.6 
Latino 742 1.8 
 
In 2005, the black incarceration rate in Washington, 2522 per 100,000 
black residents, was greater than the national average.76 The Latino 
incarceration rate, reported at 527 per 100,000 Latino residents, was 
lower than the national average. We include this figure with caution, 
however, because many local jails, including King County’s, do not 
collect ethnic demographic information. In 2005, blacks in Washington 
were incarcerated at 6.4 times and Latinos at 1.3 times the rate of whites, 
with the caveat that the Latino figure likely reflects both an undercount 
of Latinos and an overcount of whites.77 The fact of racial and ethnic 
disproportionality in Washington’s incarcerated population is 
indisputable. 
 
TABLE 2: PRISON AND JAIL INCARCERATION RATES AND RATIOS, 
2005, WASHINGTON78 
 Incarceration rate 
(per 100,000) 
Disproportionality ratio 
(in comparison to 
White) 
White 393 n/a 
Black 2522 6.4 
Latino 527 1.3 
 
                                                     
75. Id. at 4 tbl.1. 
76. Id. at 6 tbl.2, 11 tbl.6, 13 tbl.7. 
77. Id. at 6 tbl.2. The result is that the Latino-white ratio is likely significantly greater than 1.3 to 
1 and the black-white ratio is probably slightly higher than 6.4 to 1. Id. 
78. Id. at 6 tbl.2. 
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Our review of more recent data reveals that racial and ethnic 
disproportionalities exist at many different stages of the criminal justice 
system, including arrest, charging, conviction, and imprisonment.79 The 
figure below shows 2010 Hispanic-white, black-white, and Native-white 
disproportionality ratios at conviction for serious felonies by offense 
categories. The figure shows that the disproportionalities are not 
consistent for different offense categories. 
 
FIGURE 1: 2010 HISPANIC-WHITE, NATIVE AMERICAN-WHITE, AND 
BLACK-WHITE DISPROPORTIONALITY RATIOS AT CONVICTION FOR 
SERIOUS FELONIES BY OFFENSE CATEGORIES80 
 
The data provided to us by the Office of Financial Management, the 
Washington State Center for Court Research, and the Washington 
Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs on arrests, charges, 
convictions, and imprisonment show that racial and ethnic 
disproportionalities still exist at these different points in Washington’s 
criminal justice system. We turn now to examine possible causes of 
these disproportionalities. 
                                                     
79. See discussion infra Part III. 
80. These ratios are comparisons between the rates per 100,000. For example, Figure 1 illustrates 
that blacks and Native Americans are, respectively, over five and two times more likely than whites 
to be convicted of a violent offense. The 2010 data are on file with the Gonzaga Law Review. 
04 - WLR March 2012 Task Force Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012 11:17 AM 
2012] RACE & WASHINGTON’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 
 
III.  PROFFERED CAUSES FOR RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY 
A.  Crime Commission Rates 
The best available evidence suggests that the disproportionalities 
discussed in Part II are only partly attributable to racial differences in 
crime commission rates. It is important to note that crime commission 
rates cannot be known directly and can only be estimated. Generally, 
two methods are used to estimate the level of crime commission among 
different racial and ethnic groups. Some criminologists use crime 
victimization survey data in which victims identify the perceived race of 
their assailant to gain insight regarding differential commission rates by 
race.81 These data reflect victim perceptions of racial identity of their 
assailant and include only nonfatal but violent crimes where there is 
direct contact between the victim and the perpetrator (e.g., robbery, rape, 
and assault).82 Because information about victim perceptions of 
perpetrators’ race is available for only a few violent offenses, crime 
victimization survey data present an incomplete picture of crime 
commission rates by race. 
Other criminologists use arrests as a proxy for crime commission.83 
But this likely presents a distorted picture because blacks are 
overrepresented in arrests compared to victim identifications. For 
example, in the 2005 crime victim survey, victims of nonfatal violent 
crimes identified their assailants as black 23.7% of the time.84 By 
contrast, 39% of those arrested for nonfatal violent crimes in 2005 were 
black.85 Consequently, studies that treat arrests as a measure of crime 
commission will likely overstate the rate of crime commission by blacks 
and therefore underestimate racial disparity in criminal justice 
processing. 
A recent comprehensive review of data from numerous studies of the 
effect of race on the police decision to arrest similarly concludes that 
                                                     
81. See, e.g., Patrick A. Langan, Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Explain the Racial 
Composition of Prisons in the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 666 (1985) (relying on 
victim reports to generate a study on the racial composition of prisons). 
82. See id. 
83. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 67. 
84. Victimization survey data are drawn from BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 215244, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005 
STATISTICAL TABLES tbls.40 & 46 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/cvus05.pdf. 
85. Arrest data are drawn from Crime in the United States 2005, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION tbl.43 (Sept. 2006), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_43.html. 
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minority suspects are more likely to be arrested than white suspects.86 
This analysis controls for “demeanor, offense severity, presence of 
witnesses, quantity of evidence at the scene, the occurrence or discovery 
of a new criminal offense during the encounter, the suspect being under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, prior record of suspect, [and] requests 
to arrest by victims . . . .”87 Race appears to have an impact apart from 
these factors.88 
Differences in reporting practices and offending patterns may also 
contribute to the overrepresentation of black suspects among arrestees. 
As a result of these differences, black suspects are more likely to come 
to the attention of the police.89 Specifically, most white victims identify 
their assailants as white, and most black victims identify their assailants 
as black.90 Over half of violent crimes and over 60% of property crimes 
are not reported by victims to the police.91 Higher reporting rates among 
black victims mean that crimes involving black suspects are more likely 
to come to the attention of the police.92 
But even if we use arrest rates as a proxy for crime commission, there 
remains a very significant disproportionality at imprisonment that is not 
accounted for by arrest rates. A 1994 study by Crutchfield, Bridges, and 
Pitchford compared black-white disproportionality in 1982 index crime 
arrests and incarceration rates, and found that differential rates of crime 
commission (as measured by arrest) explained only 19.3% of the black-
white disproportionality in Washington State prisons.93 Using 2009 data 
obtained from the Washington State Association of Sheriffs and Police 
Chiefs, we replicated the Crutchfield et al. analysis and found that 55% 
of the black-white disproportionality in imprisonment rates is 
attributable to index crime arrest rates.94 In other words, 45% of the 
                                                     
86. Tammy Rinehart Kochel et al., Effect of Suspect Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 
CRIMINOLOGY 473, 475 (2011). 
87. Id. at 495–98. 
88. Id. at 490. 
89. ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 
214258, BLACK VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 5 tbl.5 (2007), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/bvvc.pdf (noting the percentage of violent victimization 
from 2001 to 2005, by victim race/Hispanic origin and offender race). 
90. Id. 
91. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 231327, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009, at 9 tbl.12 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv09.pdf (noting the percentage of crimes reported to the 
police in 2009, by gender, race, and Hispanic origin). 
92. Id. 
93. Crutchfield et al., supra note 69. 
94. Index crimes are defined by the FBI and include homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
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racial disproportionality in imprisonment is not attributable to racial 
differences in arrest rates. Thus, it appears that a larger share of 
disproportionality in confinement rates stems from arrest patterns than 
was the case in 1982. 
However, the 55% figure should not be interpreted as evidence that 
differences in crime commission rates explain over half of the 
overrepresentation of blacks in state prisons for several reasons.95 First, 
this interpretation assumes arrests are an accurate measure of crime, but 
it is likely that they overrepresent people of color for the reasons stated 
above. In particular, arrest data probably overrepresent black suspects.96 
In addition, Latinos are not identified as such in the arrest and 
incarceration data for which the 55% figure is derived.97 Because most 
Latinos in Washington State are identified racially as white in these data, 
the white arrest and incarceration rates used in these calculations are 
inflated, and the results therefore underestimate the extent to which 
blacks are overrepresented at the arrest stage relative to crime 
commission rates. Finally, this method assesses disproportionality in 
state prisons but does not tell us anything about racial 
disproportionalities in jails, community supervision, and misdemeanor 
courts. Indeed it is likely that discretion and disproportionality are 
greater in these parts of the criminal justice system. Thus, concluding 
that 55% of the racial disproportionality in imprisonment rates is 
attributable to arrest patterns, and assuming that arrest patterns reflect 
crime commission rates, overstates the extent to which 
disproportionality in prisons flows from differential crime commission 
rates. Whatever the precise figure, it is clear that differential crime 
commission rates can explain only a part of the racial 
disproportionalities that characterize Washington State courts, jails, and 
prisons. 
                                                     
burglary, larceny (over $50), motor vehicle theft, and arson. Uniform Crime Reporting Program 
Frequently Asked Questions, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 2 (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/frequently-asked-questions/ucr_faqs08.pdf. The 2009 data are 
on file with the Gonzaga Law Review. This analysis involved calculating the black-white arrest and 
imprisonment disproportionality ratios, and then the percent of the latter that is a function of the 
former. 
95. Nor should this figure be interpreted to mean that 45% of disproportionality in confinement 
necessarily stems from race differences in criminal justice processing: legally relevant factors such 
as offender score may account for some or all of this discrepancy. 
96. Arrest data are problematic because a comparison of victimization surveys and arrest data 
show that blacks are arrested at a higher rate than they are identified by victims. See discussion 
supra notes 89–94; see also Kochel et al., supra note 86. 
97. Again, this is because some state and local agencies do not identify Latinos as a separate 
racial group. 
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B.  Structural Racism: Facially Neutral Policies with Racially 
Disparate Effects 
The Research Working Group focused its efforts on nine issues 
covered by existing research and data, and in each area we found that 
racial disproportionalities are caused, in part, by practices and policies 
that produce racially disparate outcomes. We are not arguing that 
particular individuals, actors, or agencies are intentionally 
discriminating. The studies described below do not prove that any one 
actor or group of actors is racist. Rather, the research as a whole 
suggests that Washington State’s criminal justice system facilitates 
racially disparate outcomes in two more subtle ways. First, in some 
instances, facially neutral policies have racially disparate outcomes. For 
example, judicial consideration of ostensibly race-neutral factors such as 
employment status when making pretrial release decisions disadvantages 
defendants of color because they are less likely than white defendants to 
be employed.98 
Second, the research suggests that the race or ethnicity of suspects 
and defendants affects how those individuals are perceived, and that this 
perception impacts how they are treated within the criminal justice 
system. The literature on implicit bias, discussed in Part III.C, shows 
that these race effects are likely to be unconscious and unintended rather 
than conscious and purposeful. While traditional models of racism 
emphasize individual acts of discrimination or racially charged policies, 
structural racism describes the interaction between various institutions 
and practices that are neutral on their face but nevertheless produce 
racialized outcomes.99 
Put differently, structures matter and a system’s structure has a 
tremendous influence over the results a system produces. Policies can 
produce foreseeable, if unintended, harms that run along racial lines.100 
                                                     
98. See Washington State Employment Situation Report for March 2010, WASH. STATE EMP’T 
SEC. DEP’T (Apr. 13, 2010) (on file with Washington Law Review) which states:  
Historically, the Black or African American population has had the highest unemployment 
rates, roughly twice that of both white and Asian populations. For the first quarter of 2010, the 
Black or African American population had an unemployment rate of 16.7 percent, the white 
and Asian populations, 9.5 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively. The Black or African 
American unemployment rate jumped by 3.1 percent between the first quarter of 2009 and the 
first quarter of 2010, while white and Asian populations increased only 1.3 percent and 1.6 
percent, respectively. 
Id. 
99. See generally John A. Powell, Structural Racism: Building upon the Insights of John 
Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791 (2008). 
100. Id. at 794. 
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Moreover, bias may be unconscious or conscious. This suggests that we 
should not concentrate on individual motives but instead on those 
practices and procedures whose cumulative effect is to facilitate 
racialized outcomes—that is, outcomes that fall along racial lines. By 
identifying and then reforming these structures and processes, we can 
begin to address racial disproportionality within Washington’s criminal 
justice system. 
The Research Working Group’s findings are discussed below 
regarding each studied context of disproportionality in Washington 
State’s criminal justice system. 
1.  Racial Disparity in Juvenile Justice 
Youth of color are overrepresented in Washington State’s juvenile 
justice system.101 Although policymakers, practitioners, and researchers 
have studied this disproportionate minority contact (DMC) for the past 
twenty years,102 the problem still persists. For example, in 2007, African 
American youth comprised just under 6% of the state’s population aged 
ten through seventeen years, but comprised roughly 12% of the state’s 
juvenile arrests.103 Youth of color are similarly overrepresented at the 
disposition stage (that is, the stage at which a decision or conviction is 
rendered). Two years prior, in 2005, African American youth comprised 
just under 4% of the state’s population, but received over 13% of the 
state’s juvenile dispositions.104 There was a similar pattern of 
overrepresentation for Latino youth (11% of the state population, yet 
received 14% of the juvenile dispositions)105 and for Native American 
youth (2% of the state population yet received nearly 5% of the juvenile 
dispositions).106 
This disproportionality is even greater for youth committed to the 
                                                     
101. WASH. STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN 
JUVENILE SENTENCING, FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 1 & tbl.1 (2005), available at 
http://www.cfc.wa.gov/PublicationSentencing/DisparityDisproportionality/Adult_DisparityDisprop
ortionality_FY2005.pdf. 
102. See, e.g., Emily R. Cabaniss et al., Reducing Disproportionate Minority Contact in the 
Juvenile Justice System: Promising Practices, 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 393, 394–400 
(2007) (discussing scholarly and congressional efforts that have taken place since 1988). 
103. GOVERNOR’S JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOC. & 
HEALTH SERVS., TITLE II FORMULA GRANTS PROGRAM APPLICATION: COMPREHENSIVE 3-YEAR 
PLAN FOR FFY 2009–2011, at 13 (2009), available at http://juvjustice.njjn.org/media/ 
resources/public/resource_308.pdf. 
104. See WASH. STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, supra note 101. 
105. See id. 
106. Id. 
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Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration (JRA).107 The proportion of 
African American youth in JRA facilities is five to six times the 
proportion of their population in the state;108 Native American youth 
reside in JRA facilities at a rate of two times the proportion of their 
respective population in Washington State.109 
Even worse, it appears that youth of color may receive disparate 
sentencing decisions. In 2005, African American and Asian or Pacific 
Islander youth were sentenced to the longest average terms in county 
detention.110 African American youth also received the longest terms of 
dispositions involving electronic home monitoring and work crew.111 
Factors other than differential crime commission rates may contribute 
to these racialized outcomes. For instance, a study of probation officers’ 
assessments of youth in Washington State has found that African 
American youth receive more negative attribution assessments about the 
causes of their offenses than white youth and that these characterizations 
lead to more punitive sentence recommendations.112 In particular, the 
study shows that probation officers consistently portray black youth 
differently than white youth in descriptions about the nature of their 
criminal offending.113 Black youths’ crimes are commonly attributed to 
internal traits (attitudes and personalities) while white youths’ crimes are 
attributed to their social environment (peers and family).114 These 
characterizations shape probation officers’ assessments about the threat 
of future offending and lead to more severe sanctions and sentencing 
recommendations for black youth.115 
Policy changes are needed to both assess and address rates of DMC 
and to investigate the mechanisms that produce the disproportionate and 
disparate outcomes. We recommend increasing the quality and access to 
data management systems that can generate case characteristics. These 
characteristics are critical to investigating the extent of DMC and the 
processes that lead to the overrepresentation. 
                                                     
107. Washington State’s JRA serves the state’s highest-risk youth. See GOVERNOR’S JUVENILE 
JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 103, at 4. A county juvenile court may commit a particular 
juvenile offender to JRA custody if the individual has committed many lower-level offenses or a 
serious crime. See id. 




112. Bridges & Steen, supra note 8. 
113. Id. at 563–64. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 564–66. 
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Furthermore, decision-making environments need to be explored for 
points of discretion that can lead to youth of color being overselected for 
more severe sanctioning decisions (such as policies leading to detention 
decisions and practices of case assessments and recommendations). 
Organizational climates should recognize the ways in which subtle 
biases can enter into decision-making, and decision-makers should 
openly discuss how differences in culture can influence processing 
decisions. 
2.  Prosecutorial Decision-Making 
Prosecutors’ charging decisions and sentencing recommendations 
have an important impact on criminal justice outcomes. For example, a 
1995 study by Crutchfield, Weis, Engen, and Gainey found that 
prosecutors are significantly less likely to file charges against white 
defendants than they are against defendants of color.116 This difference 
persists even after legally relevant factors—offense seriousness, criminal 
history, and weapons charges—are taken into account.117 That study also 
found that King County prosecutors recommend longer confinement 
sentences for black defendants (after legal factors were held constant), 
and that prosecutors are 75% less likely to recommend alternative 
sentences for black defendants than for similarly situated white 
defendants.118 
3.  Confinement Sentencing Outcomes 
Several studies following the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981119 find 
that race shapes confinement sentence outcomes in Washington State—
that is, those sentences that lead to jail time. A 2003 study by Engen, 
Gainey, Crutchfield, and Weis found that defendants of color are 
moderately less likely than similarly situated white defendants to receive 
sentences that fall below the standard range.120 A 2004 study by 
Fernandez and Bowman found that Latino defendants sentenced in 
                                                     
116. ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH. 
STATE SUPREME COURT, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY 
CASES IN KING COUNTY 4 (1995), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/committee/ 
pdf/November%201995%20Report.pdf. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 39–40. 
119. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.010–.930 (2010 & Supp. 2011). 
120. Rodney L. Engen et al., Discretion and Disparity Under Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of 
Departures and Structured Sentencing Alternatives, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 116–17 (2003); see also 
CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., supra note 9, at 32, 34, 72 tbl.13B. 
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conservative counties with comparatively large Latino populations are 
less likely to receive the statutorily established drug-offender sentencing 
alternative than other defendants.121 And most recently, a 2005 study by 
Steen, Engen, and Gainey found that among felony drug offenders, the 
odds that a black defendant will be sentenced to prison are 62% greater 
than the odds for similarly situated white defendants.122 These studies 
clearly indicate that race and ethnicity matter for confinement sentencing 
outcomes. 
4.  Variability and Ethnic Disparity in the Assessment of  
“Legal Financial Obligations” in Washington State Courts 
Whenever a person is convicted in a Washington State superior court, 
the court may order the payment of a “legal financial obligation” 
(“LFO”), which is essentially a financial penalty that the defendant must 
pay as a consequence of the conviction.123 LFOs are now a common 
supplement to prison, jail, and probation sentences for people convicted 
of crimes in Washington State courts. For example, all felons must be 
assessed a $500 Victim Penalty Assessment Fee for each conviction and 
a $100 DNA Collection Fee at the time of the first conviction.124 
Although fine and fee amounts are specified statutorily, judges have 
significant discretion in determining whether to impose many other 
authorized fees and fines.125 
This judicial discretion has led to a high degree of variability in LFO 
assessment. Significant variation exists even among similar cases and 
similarly situated offenders.126 For example, one first-time white 
defendant convicted of delivery of methamphetamine in the first two 
months of 2004 was assessed $610 in fees and fines; in a different 
county, another first-time white defendant convicted of the same crime 
during the same time period was assessed $6710 in fees and fines.127 
                                                     
121. Kenneth E. Fernandez & Timothy Bowman, Race, Political Institutions, and Criminal 
Justice: An Examination of the Sentencing of Latino Offenders, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 
63, 66–68 (2004). 
122. Steen et al., supra note 10. 
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.760 (Supp. 2011). 
124. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.68.035, 43.43.690 (2010 & Supp. 2011). 
125. KATHERINE A. BECKETT ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH. 
STATE SUPREME COURT, THE ASSESSMENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL 
OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE 9–10 (2008), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/ 
committee/pdf/2008LFO_report.pdf. 
126. Id. at 24 tbl.4 (depicting wide variations in Washington State superior court LFO 
assessments). 
127. Id. 
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This variability also fosters racialized outcomes. A recent study of 
Washington State LFOs found that a number of extra-legal factors 
influence the assessment of fees and fines, even after controlling for 
offender and Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) offense score.128 In 
particular, the statistical analysis shows that Latino defendants receive 
significantly greater fees and fines than similarly situated non-Latino 
defendants.129 
The debt that accrues from the assessment of fees and fines is 
substantial relative to ex-offenders’ expected earnings.130 For instance, 
defendants sentenced in the first two months of 2004 had been assessed 
an average of $11,471 by the courts over their lifetime.131 Because 
Washington State currently charges 12% interest on unpaid LFOs, these 
financial obligations often persist and expand over the course of many 
years.132 By 2008, the individuals sentenced in early 2004 still owed an 
average of $10,840 in court debt.133 Ex-offenders who consistently pay 
$50 a month will still possess legal debt after thirty years of regular 
monthly payments.134 Legal debt—and poor credit ratings—constrains 
opportunities and limits access to housing, education, and economic 
markets.135 Nonpayment of legal debt may also trigger arrest and 
reincarceration.136 We believe that the fairness and wisdom of the laws 
authorizing the discretionary assessment of legal financial obligations 
need to be reevaluated. 
5.  Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Release Decisions in 
Washington State Courts 
Whether an individual is released pending trial has a significant 
influence on the outcome of a case, and it can have cascading effects on 
a defendant’s family, ability to maintain a job, and ability to pay for 
                                                     
128. Id. at 23–25. 
129. Id. at 24–25; see also Alexes Harris et al., Courtesy Stigma and Monetary Sanctions: 
Toward a Socio-Cultural Theory of Punishment, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 234, 248–52 (2011). 
130. Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the 
Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1756 (2010). 
131. Id. at 1773–75. 
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (Supp. 2011). 
133. Harris et al., supra note 130, at 1775. 
134. Id. at 1776–77. 
135. Id. at 1777–82.  
136. Id. at 1782–85; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF 
AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 5, 6 (2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/ 
assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf#page=8. 
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representation.137 The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 78% of 
defendants held on bail while awaiting trial were convicted, compared to 
60% of defendants who were released pending trial.138 In addition, 
defendants held on bail receive more severe sentences than defendants 
not detained prior to trial.139 Studies suggest that this correlation is not 
solely a function of case characteristics.140 Rather, detention itself has a 
small but statistically significant effect on nonfelony case outcomes and 
a significant impact on felony case outcomes.141 
Although Washington State court rules specify factors courts must 
consider when determining whether to release a defendant, judges retain 
significant discretion.142 Research demonstrates that extra-legal factors, 
including race and ethnicity, significantly impact pretrial release 
decisions.143 In particular, the evidence shows that blacks and Latinos 
are detained before trial at higher rates than white defendants.144 For 
instance, a 1997 University of Washington study found that “minority 
defendants and men were less likely to be released on their own 
recognizance than others even after adjusting for differences among 
defendants in the severity of their crimes, prior criminal records, ties to 
the community and the prosecuting attorney’s recommendation.”145 
Thus, defendants of color are held on bail at higher rates than other 
defendants. Given how much pretrial detention affects case outcomes, 
this finding is troubling. 
Judges’ consideration of seemingly race-neutral factors may explain 
the disparate pretrial detention of defendants of color. In particular, 
when determining whether to release a defendant or to impose bail, 
judges often consider the defendant’s employment status, the length and 
                                                     
137. See generally JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A STUDY OF BAIL AND 
DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1979). 
138. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SER. NO. NCJ 214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 7 
& tbl.5 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf. 
139. Id. 
140. MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL DETENTION AND 
CASE OUTCOMES, PART 1: NONFELONY CASES 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/detention.pdf; MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART 2: FELONY CASES 58 (2008) 
[hereinafter PHILLIPS, FELONY CASE OUTCOMES], available at http://www.cja 
reports.org/reports/felonydetention.pdf. 
141. PHILLIPS, FELONY CASE OUTCOMES, supra note 140. 
142. BRIDGES, supra note 65, at 1–2. 
143. Id. at 7. 
144. Id. at 52–53. 
145. Id. at 7. 
04 - WLR March 2012 Task Force Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012 11:17 AM 
2012] RACE & WASHINGTON’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 29 
 
character of the defendant’s residence in the community, and the 
defendant’s family ties and relationships.146 Though presumably not 
designed to disadvantage people of color, consideration of these factors 
often has that consequence.147 African Americans, Native Americans, 
and Latinos are more likely to be economically disadvantaged, have 
unstable employment, experience more family disruptions, and have 
more residential mobility.148 Judicial focus on such factors means that 
people from these ethnic groups are less likely to be released on their 
own recognizance than whites.149 We suggest that courts should consider 
factors that are not only race-neutral on their face but also race-neutral in 
practice when making pretrial detention decisions. 
6.  Racial Disparity in Drug Law Enforcement 
Seattle has one of the highest rates of racial disparity in drug arrests in 
the United States.150 Although only 8% of Seattle’s population is black, 
67% of those who are arrested for delivery of a serious drug (narcotics 
other than marijuana) in Seattle are black.151 However, a rigorous, data-
driven 2008 analysis of drug use, delivery, and law enforcement patterns 
in Seattle indicates that this racial disparity in arrest rates does not reflect 
the reality of the local drug economy.152 Nor is it a function of public 
health, public safety, or civilian complaints.153 
According to Seattle Police Department (SPD) arrest figures, the total 
black drug arrest rate was more than thirteen times higher than the white 
drug arrest rate in 2006.154 Blacks were more than twenty-one times 
more likely to be arrested for selling serious drugs than whites in 2005 to 
2006, despite the fact that multiple sources suggest that whites are the 
majority of sellers and users of serious drugs in Seattle.155 This rate of 
                                                     
146. Id. at 12. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 53. 
150. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 56 tbl.10; Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 
64, at 115 & tbl.1. 
151. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 56 tbl.10. 
152. Id. at 1; see also Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 64, at 119; Beckett et 
al., Lessons from Seattle, supra note 64, at 419, 426–29. 
153. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 3; see also Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 
64, at 129; Beckett et al., Lessons from Seattle, supra note 64, at 430–35. 
154. BECKETT, supra note 14. 
155. See id. (using multiple data sources, such as questionnaires and surveys, police reports, and 
live observations). 
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disparity is surpassed by only one of the other thirty-eight comparably 
sized cities in the nation for which data are available.156 
The research shows that the primary cause of racial disparity in 
Seattle’s drug law enforcement is SPD’s focus on crack cocaine—to the 
virtual exclusion of other serious drugs such as heroin, powder cocaine, 
ecstasy, and methamphetamine.157 In 2005 to 2006, nearly three-quarters 
(74.1%) of all planned arrests for delivery of a serious drug involved 
crack cocaine, a pattern that has remained consistent over time.158 Of 
those individuals arrested for crack-cocaine delivery, 73.4% were 
black.159 By contrast, less than 20% of those arrested for delivering any 
other serious drug were black.160 
The overrepresentation of crack-cocaine offenders among drug 
arrestees does not appear to be a function of public health and safety 
concerns, nor of resident complaints.161 Powder cocaine and ecstasy—
not crack cocaine—are the most widely used serious drugs in Seattle.162 
Although crack-cocaine use poses health risks, it is less likely than other 
serious drugs, such as heroin and other opiates, to be associated with 
infectious disease and drug-related mortality.163 Moreover, those arrested 
for crack-cocaine offenses are the least likely among serious drug users 
to possess a dangerous weapon at the time of arrest.164 Lastly, there is 
little geographic correlation between the areas identified by civilian 
complainants and the places where planned drug-delivery arrests 
occur.165 
We believe that a less harmful approach to drug law enforcement is 
necessary. Community-based diversion programs provide a viable 
alternative to traditional drug law enforcement methods.166 A more 
equitable enforcement of drug laws would immediately begin to address 
racial disproportionality, especially when illicit drug use is roughly equal 
                                                     
156. Id. 
157. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 48. 
158. Id. (based on a four-month sampling period of May and June in 2005 and 2006); see also 
Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 64, at 123–24. 
159. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 2. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 3; see also Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing, supra note 64, at 129; Beckett et 
al., Lessons from Seattle, supra note 64, at 430–35. 
162. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 20–21. 
163. Id. at 433–34. 
164. Id. at 433; see also BECKETT, supra note 14, at 96. 
165. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 88–91. 
166. MELISSA BULL, JUST TREATMENT: A REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR THE 
DIVERSION OF DRUG RELATED OFFENDERS FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23–26 (2003). 
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for each racial or ethnic group. 
7.  Drug-Related Asset Forfeiture Distorts Law Enforcement  
Priorities in Washington State 
Drug-related asset forfeiture is an important tool for law enforcement. 
Forfeiture laws reduce the incentive for financially motivated crimes 
such as drug trafficking by removing the assets that help make such 
activities profitable.167 Washington State allows local law enforcement 
agencies to retain 90% of the net proceeds from drug-related assets 
seized, but the state requires that these funds be used “exclusively for the 
expansion and improvement of controlled substances related law 
enforcement activity.”168 
This allocation creates a conflict between a law enforcement agency’s 
economic self-interest and traditional law enforcement objectives.169 In 
particular, section 69.50.505 of the Revised Code of Washington creates 
a perverse dependence whereby law enforcement agencies rely on assets 
seized during drug investigations to fund their operations.170 This 
dependence inevitably skews how law enforcement agencies allocate 
their resources, and it affects operational decisions regarding whether to 
target particular crimes and how to exercise discretion when making 
arrests.171 Legitimate goals of crime prevention are compromised when 
                                                     
167. The Washington State Legislature made several findings in 1989 when it was considering 
the asset forfeiture law, including the following:  
[D]rug-related offenses are difficult to eradicate because of the profits derived from the 
criminal activities, which can be invested in legitimate assets and later used for further criminal 
activities; and the forfeiture of real assets where a substantial nexus exists between the 
commercial production or sale of the substances and the real property will provide a significant 
deterrent to crime by removing the profit incentive of drug trafficking, and will provide a 
revenue source that will partially defray the large costs incurred by government as a result of 
these crimes. 
Omnibus Alcohol and Controlled Substances Act, ch. 271, § 211, 1989 Wash. Sess. Laws 1266, 
1298–99 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 note (2010)); see also United States v. Two 
Tracts of Real Prop., 998 F.2d 204, 213 (4th Cir. 1993) (“One of the most potent weapons in the 
government’s war on drugs is its ability to obtain the civil forfeiture of property that aids violations 
of the drug laws.”). 
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(10). The remaining 10% of the net proceeds are deposited 
into the state general fund. See id. § 69.50.505(9). 
169. Eric D. Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, The Next Stage of Forfeiture Reform, 14 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 76, 76 (2001). 
170. Cf. MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF 
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 12 (2010), available at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_ 
folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf (noting that in a nationwide survey, hundreds of law 
enforcement executives admitted that “civil forfeiture proceeds were a necessary budget 
supplement”). 
171. Id. at 12–13 (“One consequence of giving law enforcement a pecuniary interest in forfeiture 
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salaries, equipment, and departmental budgets depend on how many 
assets are seized during drug investigations.172 
Additionally, the standard of proof in Washington State for the 
government to successfully claim property through asset forfeiture is one 
of the lowest in the country, and it is highly deferential to law 
enforcement.173 Section 69.50.505 requires only that a law enforcement 
officer have “probable cause” to believe the property is linked to 
criminal activity in order to lawfully seize it.174 Making matters worse, 
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish probable cause to seize 
a person’s property.175 If a property owner challenges the seizure, the 
burden is only slightly increased to a “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard.176 The low evidentiary threshold is troubling because many 
property owners whose assets are seized are never charged with a crime 
or are not convicted. Investigators at the Seattle Post-Intelligencer found 
that 20% of people whose property is seized are never charged with a 
crime, and that 40% of the time there is no conviction.177 In fact, even in 
those cases where charges are filed, the case is dropped 23% of the 
time.178 
                                                     
proceeds is that it can cause them to over-enforce crimes that carry the possibility of forfeiture to the 
neglect of other law enforcement objectives. This makes basic economic sense; as the return to 
enforcing certain crimes increases, one would expect law enforcement agencies to devote a higher 
percentage of their resources to those aims.”); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: 
The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 40 (1998) (“First, these [asset 
forfeiture] programs have distorted governmental policymaking and law enforcement. During the 
past decade, law enforcement agencies increasingly have turned to asset seizures and drug 
enforcement grants to compensate for budgetary shortfalls, at the expense of other criminal justice 
goals. We believe the strange shape of the criminal justice system today . . . is largely the unplanned 
by-product of this economic incentive structure.”). 
172. Eric D. Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, Contesting Government’s Financial Interest in Drug 
Cases, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1999, at 4, 5. 
173. The highest standard is proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” followed by proof upon “clear 
and convincing evidence.” The lowest standard is “probable cause,” which is used in fourteen states, 
including Washington. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 170, at 22. 
174.  Valerio v. Lacey Police Dep’t, 39 P.3d 332, 339 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (Division II 
concluding that property may be seized if law enforcement has probable cause to suspect that the 
property in question was used in connection with illegal narcotics activity); Escamilla v. Tri-City 
Metro Drug Task Force, 999 P.2d 625, 630 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (Division III concluding the 
same); Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 784 P.2d 537, 540-41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (Division I 
concluding that initial seizure of property under Washington’s asset forfeiture law requires a 
showing of probable cause that the property was used for illegal narcotics activity), rev’d on other 
grounds, 804 P.2d 24 (Wash. 1991). 
175. Adams County v. One 1978 Blue Ford Bronco, 875 P.2d 690, 692 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
176. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(5) (2010). 
177. Sam Skolnik, Critics Target Drug Raid Seizures, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 13, 
2001, at A1, available at http://o.seattlepi.com/frontpage/seattle_pima1x220011213.pdf. 
178. Id. 
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The evidence suggests that the combination of tremendous financial 
incentives and limited property rights distorts drug-related priorities and 
pressures police to make operational decisions to maximize perceived 
financial rewards.179 Especially today, with budgets already stretched 
thin, Washington’s police departments are increasingly dependent on 
prosecuting the drug war to ensure their economic survival. 
Washington’s drug-related asset forfeiture laws reinforce drug-related 
law enforcement tactics that have a disparate impact on racial 
minorities.180 As discussed above, two-thirds of those arrested for 
delivery of a serious narcotics offense in Seattle are black.181 Because a 
drug arrest automatically renders much of a defendant’s property 
seizable, section 69.50.505 of the Revised Code of Washington has a 
disparate impact on defendants of color. 
Furthermore, despite the substantial property interests involved, 
indigent defendants do not have a right to appointed counsel when 
challenging an asset seizure.182 Because indigent defendants tend to be 
people of color, minority property owners are at a distinct disadvantage 
and bear greater risk that their assets will be liquidated. 
We believe that Washington State’s drug-related asset forfeiture laws 
can be greatly improved with three simple reforms. First, we urge 
Washington State to end the direct profit incentive that allocates 90% of 
the net proceeds from asset forfeitures to law enforcement agencies.183 
So far, eight states have enacted reforms to end the direct profit 
incentive in their drug-related asset forfeiture laws by placing forfeiture 
revenue into a neutral account, such as education, drug treatment, or 
ideally, in the general treasury of the city, county, or state government 
that oversees the seizing agency.184 This single measure could cure the 
                                                     
179. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 170, at 13 (“[T]his is not simply theory. Earlier research 
found that in states where agencies get to keep the lion’s share of forfeiture proceeds, drug arrests—
which often have the potential of a related civil forfeiture—constitute a significantly higher 
percentage of all arrests.”); Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 78–79 (discussing how police 
have an incentive to target buyers in reverse stings because it allows officers to seize the buyer’s 
cash). 
180. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 171, at 39–40 (noting that traditional drug-enforcement 
strategy has “a self-perpetuating life of its own” because of the “lucrative rewards available to 
police and prosecutorial agencies that make drug law enforcement their highest priority”). 
181. BECKETT, supra note 14, at 1. 
182. See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505 (2010). The statute provides only that a property owner 
may be entitled to attorneys’ fees if the owner “substantially prevails” in a proceeding to reclaim his 
or her property. Id. § 69.50.505(6). 
183. Id. § 69.50.505(10).  
184. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 170, at 17. Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, and Vermont do not distribute any of the proceeds to law 
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forfeiture law of its most corrupting effects.185 
Second, we recommend increasing the burden of proof required to 
seize property. Requiring seizing agencies to demonstrate with “clear 
and convincing” evidence that the assets seized were linked to criminal 
activity would help protect property owners from arbitrary seizures. 
Finally, because of the important property interests at stake, we 
suggest that indigent persons be provided with counsel when their assets 
are seized. Providing counsel for indigent defendants would help protect 
property interests that are often key to indigent persons’ livelihood. 
As long as police agencies can expect a financial reward for asset 
seizures, they will remain dependent on current tactics that have a 
disparate impact on racial minorities. 
8.  Racial Disparity in Traffic Enforcement 
Since 2000, the Washington State Patrol (WSP) has collected data on 
its traffic stops.186 WSP requires its troopers to maintain data for every 
contact they have with a motorist, including whether the motorist is 
stopped, searched, and cited, as well as the driver’s race and ethnicity.187 
Studies based on this data have found no evidence of racial profiling or 
any observable racial disparity in traffic stops.188 Although black, Native 
American, and Hispanic drivers are stopped at higher rates than white 
motorists, this appears to reflect differences in traffic violation rates.189 
There is some racial disparity, however, in the outcomes associated with 
these stops. 
Citations are one such outcome. To assess whether higher citation 
rates among drivers of color are attributable solely to differences in 
                                                     
enforcement. Id.; see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169 (discussing reform efforts around 
the country where voters have approved laws to end the “corrupting incentives” of asset-forfeiture 
allocation (quoting United States v. Funds Held in the Name or for the Benefit of Wetterer, 210 
F.3d 96, 110 (2d Cir. 2000))). 
185. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 170, at 14; Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 169, at 80–
81. 
186. LOVRICH ET AL., 2003 STUDY, supra note 63, at 22. We note that stops by local law 
enforcement constitute the large majority of traffic stops that take place in the state. But very little 
empirical data have been collected on the stop, citation, and search practices of these local law 
enforcement agencies. 
187. See Clayton Mosher et al., The Importance of Context in Understanding Biased Policing: 
State Patrol Traffic Citations in Washington State, 9 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 43, 45–46, 47–48 tbls.1 
& 2 (2008). 
188. Id. at 43–44. 
189. Many of the most frequent violations—such as driving with a suspended license or broken 
tail light—occur when people cannot afford to pay traffic fines or repair their cars. Thus, higher 
violation rates among drivers of color may reflect socioeconomic factors. See id. at 45–46, 48. 
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traffic law violation rates, researchers compared the number of alleged 
violations in WSP stops that did and did not result in citation.190 The 
results indicate that black, Native American, and Latino motorists were 
identified by WSP officers as having more traffic violations even in 
stops in which officers did not issue a citation.191 This suggests that WSP 
officers were not “piling violations on” minority drivers to justify 
issuing citations to them. Nonetheless, comparison of citation rates for 
drivers with just one violation reveals some racial differences.192 
Specifically, black, Native American, Latino, and Asian drivers with one 
traffic violation were significantly more likely to be cited than white 
motorists with one traffic violation in a total of thirty-six jurisdictions, 
but less likely to be cited than comparable white drivers in just six 
jurisdictions.193 
Additionally, researchers found that “race is clearly an important 
factor influencing the likelihood of a search.”194 In particular, the data 
show that black, Native American, and Latino motorists are significantly 
more likely to be searched once stopped than are white drivers.195 This 
disparity exists in both low- and high-discretion searches, and it persists 
after time of day and number of violations are taken into account.196 
                                                     
190. Id. at 46, 48–49. 
191. Id. at 53–54 tbl5. 
192. Id. at 51, 52 tbl.4. 
193. The authors concluded that this difference “d[id] not indicate the operation of systemic bias 
in citing minorities who have only a single violation recorded by the WSP.” Id. at 51. It is not clear 
how the authors made this determination. Forthcoming research examines and critiques the 
methodologies that LOVRICH ET AL., supra note 63, employed in their 2007 report on the WSP. See 
Mario L. Barnes & Robert S. Chang, Analyzing Stops, Citations, and Searches in Washington and 
Beyond, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Clayton Mosher & J. Mitchell Pickerill, 
Methodological Issues in Biased Policing Research with Applications to the Washington State 
Patrol, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
194. J. Mitchell Pickerill et al., Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A 
Disparate Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL’Y 1, 15 (2009). We note that an overlapping group of 
researchers, using data from WSP traffic stops between 2005 and 2007, employed a different 
methodology to analyze the disproportionate search rates to conclude that the differences were not 
indicative of discrimination. See LOVRICH ET AL., 2007 STUDY, supra note 63, at 49–50. They state 
that because the relative disproportionality between groups is the same difference in magnitude for 
low- and high-discretion searches, that this reflects a lack of bias in searches by WSP. Id. (“We 
come to this conclusion by comparing the likelihoods of high discretion searches to low discretion 
searches, which suggest that officers do not act differently based on race when they have higher 
levels of discretion.”). But their analysis and conclusions are subject to important methodological 
criticism. See Barnes & Chang, supra note 193; Mosher & Pickerill, supra note 193. 
195. Pickerill et al., supra note 194. Other driver characteristics also influence the likelihood of a 
search. See id. For example, females and older drivers are less likely to be searched than males and 
younger drivers. See id. 
196. See Pickerill et al., supra note 194, at 15, 19, 21. 
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However, the “hit rate”—that is, the share of searches that result in 
seizures—is somewhat higher for whites.197 For example, high-
discretion searches of whites led to seizures 24.1% of the time.198 But 
the hit rates for minority groups during high-discretion searches were all 
lower: 17.6% for Latinos, 22.1% for blacks, 18.1% for Native 
Americans, and 22.4% for Asians.199 These findings suggest that 
minorities are subject to a higher rate of searches as compared to white 
drivers, but that this higher rate is not warranted by any policing purpose 
because whites are more likely to have items subject to seizure. 
In short, WSP should be recognized as one of a few agencies studied 
nationwide that does not exhibit a pattern of disproportionate minority 
contact at the “stop level.”200 The data and evidence demonstrate, 
however, that WSP officers are more likely to cite black, Native 
American, and Latino drivers with one violation than white drivers with 
one violation.201 The evidence also shows that race is an important factor 
influencing the likelihood of a search.202 
9.  Racial Disparity in Driving While License Suspended (DWLS) 
Cases 
In many misdemeanor courts, Driving While License Suspended in 
the Third Degree (DWLS 3) cases constitute at least one-third of the 
caseload, and consume a dramatic percentage of misdemeanor court, 
prosecution, and public defense resources in a time of severe budget 
challenges.203 Currently, there are an estimated 100,000 DWLS 3 cases 
in Washington per year,204 many of which result from failure to pay a 
traffic ticket or to appear in court for the ticket.205 
The costs of prosecuting DWLS 3 cases are staggering. It is estimated 
that Washington’s statewide average cost of arrest is $334, cost of 
                                                     
197. Id. at 13 & tbl.3. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Mosher et al., supra note 187, at 53, 56. 
201. Pickerill et al., supra note 194, at 51. 
202. Id. at 13. We disagree with the authors’ interpretations and conclusions. 
203. John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4 SEATTLE J. 
FOR SOC. JUST. 439, 443, 460–61 (2005). 
204. JOANNE I. MOORE & DAVID K. CHAPMAN, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., DRIVING 
WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED 3RD DEGREE: SURVEY OF COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.opd.wa.gov/TrialDefense/090602_DWLS3Survey.pdf. 
205. Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 203, at 443. 
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conviction is $757, and cost per jail day is $60.71.206 Even though most 
first-time DWLS 3 convictions do not result in jail time, many people 
are jailed on the second or third offense or for failing to complete 
probationary requirements.207 The single largest factor responsible for 
driving up the costs of the criminal justice system has been the increased 
incarceration rate since 1980.208 Even if the DWLS 3 cases proceed on 
the basis of tickets and not arrests, and there is no actual jail time 
imposed, the costs of prosecuting and defending those cases approaches 
$75 million annually.209 Worse still, this cost does not take into account 
the impact on individual defendants and their family. 
Additionally, the evidence shows that this facially neutral policy—
treating driving while license suspended as a misdemeanor offense—has 
racially disparate effects. Most people charged with DWLS 3 are poor. 
A 1999 Seattle study found that of 184 people with suspended licenses, 
the average person had $2095 in unpaid fines and a monthly income of 
$810.210 Because of economic status and police deployment decisions—
and possibly because of racial profiling in some situations—people of 
color are more likely to have suspended licenses for failure to pay a 
ticket. For instance, in 2000, a Seattle Times investigation found that 
black drivers in Seattle receive more tickets and are more likely to be 
cited for defective headlights than are white drivers.211 In some 
misdemeanor courts, there is no counsel available for indigent persons at 
                                                     
206. STEVE AOS ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY 
OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME 
RATES 41 exhibit B.2 (2006), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-10-1201.pdf. 
Figures were adjusted for 2007 dollars utilizing the Implicit Price Deflator (GDP) rate; these 
computations were performed using the calculator at Samuel H. Williamson, Seven Ways to 
Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount—1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH (Mar. 
2011), http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare. 
207. See Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 203, at 440–42. 
208. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON 
STATE: INCARCERATION RATES, TAXPAYER COSTS, CRIME RATES, AND PRISON ECONOMICS 4 & 
fig.5 (2003), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/SentReport2002.pdf. 
209. This figure is based on the average cost of a DWLS 3 conviction ($757) and the estimated 
number of DWLS 3 cases per year (100,000). See AOS ET AL., supra note 206; MOORE & 
CHAPMAN, supra note 204. 
210. MUN. COURT OF SEATTLE, PARTNERS IN SERVICE TO THE COMMUNITY 1999–2000, at 7 
(2001), available at https://www.seattle.gov/courts/pdf/smcreport.pdf. 
211. Andrew Garber, Seattle Blacks Twice as Likely to Get Tickets, SEATTLE TIMES (June 14, 
2000), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20000614&slug=4026674 (“A 
Seattle Times analysis of more than 324,000 citations issued in the past five years also found blacks 
get more tickets per stop than whites and are more likely to be cited for certain offenses, such as 
defective headlights. For example, the number of tickets issued to blacks for blocking traffic is four 
times the proportion of blacks in the driving population.”). 
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first appearance or arraignment hearings, and in other courts, public 
defense attorneys are too overwhelmed with cases to provide meaningful 
assistance. As a result, people of color are more likely to be charged 
with DWLS 3. 
In response to this worsening problem, court-initiated relicensing 
programs have arisen. These programs allow individuals to have their 
license reinstated in exchange for continued payment on outstanding 
fines.212 King County District Court, for example, schedules at least two 
days per month in which an individual may enroll in the program.213 
Participants have the option to perform community service at the rate of 
$10 for each hour worked.214 The district court holds are released once 
the court receives written proof of community service hours 
performed.215 
In addition, the program offers participation in work crews and credit 
toward King County District Court fines at the rate of $150 for every 
eight-hour day worked.216 Yet another option is to make a 10% down 
payment on fines and monthly payments for the remaining balance.217 A 
community-based organization, Legacy of Equality, Leadership and 
Organizing, assists individuals with the process and refers them to the 
relicensing program.218 These programs both entice the payment of 
outstanding fines and reduce the costs of prosecution, public defense, 
and jail associated with DWLS 3 defendants.219 The King County 
District Court relicensing program is estimated to save two dollars for 
every dollar spent.220 King County is not alone in its efforts to address 
this crisis. Recently, the City of Spokane Prosecutor’s Office established 
                                                     
212. Cooper Offenbecher, DWS: A Ticket to Debtor’s Prison?, KING COUNTY B. BULL. (Apr. 
2008), http://www.kcba.org/newsevents/barbulletin/archive/2008/08-04/article1.aspx (on file with 
Washington Law Review); see also Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 203, at 463. 
213. Offenbecher, supra note 212; Relicensing Program, KING CNTY., 
http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/DistrictCourt/CitationsOrTickets/RelicensingProgram.aspx (last 
updated Jan. 20, 2012). 




218. LELO—LEGACY OF EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZING, http://www.lelo.org (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2011). The organization also conducts its own DWLS education programs. See id. 
219. Offenbecher, supra note 212. 
220. Id.; Corinna Harn, Chief Presiding Judge, King Cnty. Dist. Court, & Tricia Crozier, Chief 
Admin. Officer, King Cnty. Dist. Court, Costs & Benefits of the King County District Court 
Relicensing Program, Presentation of Findings from a Study by Christopher Murray & Associates 
(May 12, 2004) (PowerPoint slides available at DEFENDER ASS’N, 
old.defender.org/files/archive/Relicensing_Presentation.ppt (last visited Dec. 31, 2011)). 
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a diversion program for DWLS 3 cases that it believes will reduce the 
municipal court criminal caseload by 35%.221 
Because most people charged with DWLS 3 have their licenses 
suspended for not paying a fine or for missing a court hearing, we 
believe that if these individuals had the means and the knowledge to 
navigate the court system, they could have their licenses reinstated. 
Local prosecutors and courts should work with defenders and 
community groups to establish precharging diversion and relicensing 
programs where they do not now exist. Additionally, the legislature 
should amend section 46.20.289 of the Washington Revised Code so 
that drivers’ licenses are not suspended for failure to pay a ticket or 
attend a court hearing.222 
10.  Summary 
In conclusion, the evidence shows a wide variety of policies and 
practices that facilitate racial disparity in Washington’s criminal justice 
system. In the nine aforementioned areas—juvenile justice, prosecutorial 
discretion, confinement sentencing outcomes, LFOs, pretrial release, 
drug law enforcement, asset forfeiture, traffic enforcement, and 
DWLS—research has revealed that race matters at various stages in the 
disposition of criminal cases. Similarly situated persons are treated 
differently along racial lines in the studied contexts. These findings raise 
serious concerns regarding other criminal justice contexts yet to be 
examined, and they demonstrate how structural racism can and does 
affect outcomes in Washington’s criminal justice system. 
C.  Bias 
Many of us harbor explicit and implicit racial biases, regardless of our 
professed commitments to racial equality. If we have these biases, how 
many of us will admit them to ourselves, let alone to others? Even then, 
how do we know if these feelings in fact affect our behavior? Finally, if 
we admit that these feelings can affect our behaviors, are there ways to 
prevent racialized outcomes that are inconsistent with our shared 
commitment to equality? This section explores evidence regarding bias, 
                                                     
221. Robert C. Boruchowitz, AM. CONSTITUTIONAL SOC’Y, DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING 
MISDEMEANORS COULD SAVE $1 BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED FOR AND COST OF 
APPOINTED COUNSEL 9 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Boruchowitz%20-
%20Misdemeanors.pdf. 
222. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.289 (2008), invalidated on other grounds by In re Nichols, 211 
P.3d 462 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 256 P.3d 1131 (Wash. 2011). 
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the relationship between bias and behavior, and the potential for 
solutions to prevent racially disparate outcomes. 
1.  Explicit Bias as Reflected in Survey Data 
One of the best sources of survey data on racial attitudes comes from 
the General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research 
Center at the University of Chicago, which has collected data from face-
to-face surveys since 1942.223 The survey has revealed, over time, that 
white attitudes toward blacks, as measured by expressed principles, have 
shifted dramatically. For example, in 1964, 60% of white respondents 
were in favor of laws against intermarriage between blacks and 
whites.224 By 2002, the number had dropped to 10% in favor of such 
laws, though 35% still opposed intermarriage between whites and 
blacks.225 Similar trend data show that when white respondents were 
asked in 1977 about black inequality and its causes, 27% reported that it 
was due to blacks having less ability.226 By 2006, this number had 
dropped to 7% and, by 2010, it had settled at 9%.227 Interestingly, in 
1977, 66% of white respondents asked about black inequality stated that 
blacks lack motivation.228 In 2008, 52% of white respondents said that 
blacks had no motivation and 60% agreed somewhat or strongly that 
blacks should try harder.229 Some negative views, such as the attribution 
of no motivation, seem to persist at a very high rate. It is also worth 
noting that a large percentage of white respondents believe that blacks 
are treated unfairly by police, with 36% holding this view in both 1997 
and 2007.230 
The survey data show a significant diminishment in white negative 
                                                     
223. HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 59 (rev. ed. 1997). 
224. Id. at 106 tbl.3.1B. 
225. Compare id., with 2011 Update to Table 3.1B of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and 
Interpretations, INST. OF GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2011), 
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Trends%20in%20Racial%20Attitudes_3-1B.pdf. 
226. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 223, at 156–57 tbl.3.4A.  
227. 2011 Update to Table 3.4A of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations, 
INST. OF GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2011), 
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Trends%20in%20Racial%20Attitudes_3-4A.pdf. 
228. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 223, at 156–57 tbl.3.4A. 
229. 2011 Update to Table 3.4A of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations, 
supra note 227. 
230. 2011 Update to Table 3.4B of Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations, INST. 
OF GOV’T & PUB. AFFAIRS (Oct. 2011), 
http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/Trends%20in%20Racial%20Attitudes_3-4B-Sup.pdf. 
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racial attitudes toward blacks in many areas, but even this outcome 
should be taken with a grain of salt. Any survey is subject to the problem 
of response bias.231 
2.  Implicit Bias Distorts Decisions Throughout the Criminal Justice 
System 
a.  Overview on Implicit Bias 
The criminal justice system involves numerous actors—such as police 
officers, prosecutors, judges, jurors, and eyewitnesses—whose decisions 
and judgments have a significant impact on the conviction and 
punishment of criminal defendants. A great deal of research has shown 
that race significantly affects the decisions and judgments of most 
people. Some of this research has been conducted on particular actors 
within the criminal justice system. For example, the research on bias 
tends to show that a juror who associates blacks (as opposed to whites) 
with a particular crime will be more likely to convict blacks (as opposed 
to whites) of that crime on the same evidence.232 These biases are subtle 
phenomena that have some influence in any given case, but which have 
their most substantial effects over time. Biased decision-making 
artificially inflates the proportion of minorities in the criminal justice 
system, which likely creates more stereotypes and associations, thus 
resulting in a negative feedback cycle. 
The research and studies discussed below are either well-recognized 
meta-analyses233 or particular studies selected for their relevance, 
elegance, clarity, and methodological rigor. Unfortunately, much of the 
research to date has evaluated race as a white-black dichotomy.234 
Nevertheless, the studies that have expanded the race evaluation to other 
minority groups have tended to show similar results.235 Thus, no 
                                                     
231. Response bias can be produced by such things as question wording, question context, race of 
the interviewer, and privacy. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 223, at 78–79 (addressing the 
wording of questions); Maria Krysan, Privacy and the Expression of White Racial Attitudes: A 
Comparison Across Three Contexts, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 506, 525, 536 (1998) (addressing the 
privacy effect); Cynthia Webster, Hispanic and Anglo Interviewer and Respondent Ethnicity and 
Gender: The Impact on Survey Response Quality, 33 J. MARKETING RES. 62, 63, 70 (1996) 
(addressing the race and ethnicity of interviewers and respondents). 
232. See infra note 266 and accompanying text. 
233. We use the term “meta-analysis” to mean an evaluation of large collections of similar 
studies that is used to determine the general state of knowledge regarding a particular issue. 
234. See, e.g., SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 223. 
235. Compare William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing of 
Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 83 (2004) (comparing reactions to black and white faces 
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distinction between minority groups is drawn here, and further treatment 
of that issue is beyond the scope of this report. 
b.  Implicit Biases Are Pervasive 
Survey data often fail to reflect “true” attitudes, especially when 
people wish to conceal their motives or if they have unconscious biases. 
In one carefully designed experiment, researchers found that when 
offered a choice of two rooms in which movies were playing, people 
avoided the room with a disabled person, but only when doing so could 
masquerade as movie preference.236 This experiment and others like it237 
suggest that if people can act in a biased matter with plausible 
deniability, they will do so. 
The gap between true attitudes and what is expressed is exacerbated 
by the problem of unconscious or implicit bias. Much of this research is 
done in connection with the Implicit Association Test (IAT), discussed 
below, which measures reaction times in response to certain visual 
stimuli.238 Other methodologies include testing subjects while 
“measuring cardiovascular response, micro-facial movements, or 
neurological activity.”239 
The general findings, confirmed by hundreds of articles in peer-
reviewed scientific journals, are that “[i]mplicit biases—by which we 
mean implicit attitudes and stereotypes—are both pervasive (most 
individuals show evidence of some biases), and large in magnitude, 
statistically speaking. In other words, we are not, on average or 
generally, cognitively colorblind.”240 
                                                     
and finding bias in favor of white faces), and Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for 
White Americans Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
316 (2000) (comparing reactions to photos of black and white Americans and finding implicit bias 
in favor of white Americans), with Jaihyun Park et al., Implicit Attitudes Toward Arab-Muslims and 
the Moderating Effects of Social Information, 29 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 35 (2007) 
(comparing reactions to Arab and Muslim names and white names and finding strong bias in favor 
of white names). 
236. Melvin L. Snyder et al., Avoidance of the Handicapped: An Attributional Ambiguity 
Analysis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2297, 2297 (1979). 
237. Id. at 2304 (discussing bystander intervention experiments varying race of victim). 
238. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464–66 (1998). 
239. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 465, 471 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
240. Id. at 473. 
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c.  Implicit Bias Research on Race and Crime 
Individuals in our society generally associate minorities with 
criminality;241 they also exhibit implicit bias against minorities242 and 
display divergent behavior in experiments based on the manipulation of 
race as a variable (such as the race of a face in a photograph, the race of 
a character in a vignette, or even the race of an experimenter).243 
Researchers have shown that whites tend to exhibit relatively increased 
levels of activation in the amygdala—an area of the brain that is 
associated with emotional stimulation and fear—when presented with 
black as opposed to white faces.244 This effect has been correlated with 
performance on the IAT, which measures implicit conceptual 
associations and has been used by researchers to measure implicit bias in 
individuals.245 The IAT presents individuals with words or images from 
two distinct dichotomies (such as good-bad and white-black), asks 
individuals to sort the words and images according to assigned pairings 
(e.g., hit one button for each good word or black image presented, and 
hit another button for each bad word or white image presented), and then 
measures the speed and accuracy with which the individuals are able to 
sort the paired concepts. Whites generally exhibit implicit bias against 
blacks under the IAT.246 Namely, whites tend to exhibit less speed and 
accuracy when asked to associate positive concepts with black (as 
opposed to white) faces or names. In certain studies, the IAT in 
particular also has been correlated with biased behavior and decision-
making.247 
Researchers have made other findings regarding mental associations 
                                                     
241. Harris et al., supra note 129, at 241; see also infra notes 253–257 and accompanying text. 
See generally Kelly Welch, Black Criminal Stereotypes and Racial Profiling, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. 
JUST. 276 (2007). 
242. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955–56, 957–58 tbls.1 & 2 (2006); see also infra notes 246–247 and 
accompanying text. 
243. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.d–f. 
244. Phelps et al., supra note 18, at 729–33. 
245. See id. 
246. Id. at 730–31; see also Greenwald et al., supra note 238, at 1474. 
247. See Jeremy D. Heider & John J. Skowronski, Improving the Predictive Validity of the 
Implicit Association Test, 9 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 53, 71–72 (2007) (examining the extent to which 
IAT measures of racial attitudes predict social behaviors); Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, 
Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of 
Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 440 (2001) (using IAT to measure 
intergroup prejudice between white and black undergraduates). 
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of blacks with criminality. In one study, individuals primed248 with 
crime-related concepts more quickly identified computer imposed “dot-
probe[s]” on black faces than white faces.249 The individuals primed 
with crime-related concepts also identified the dot probe more quickly 
than their nonprimed counterparts,250 an effect that was replicated among 
a group of police officers.251 Further, when asked whether faces “looked 
criminal,” a racially diverse group of police officers judged black faces 
to be much more criminal-looking.252 
d.  Criminal Investigations and Arrests Are Influenced by the Race of 
Potential/Actual Suspects, and Often Are Based on a Faulty 
Application of Majoritarian Cultural Norms 
The racial component of a given case may influence judgments of 
character and guilt, expectations of recidivism, and decisions to arrest 
and charge. In one study, priming police and probation officers with 
black-related concepts significantly influenced responses to race-neutral 
vignettes of juveniles committing theft and assault.253 Specifically, the 
officers were more likely to rate the juveniles negatively, to expect 
recidivism, and to recommend arresting the juveniles if primed with 
black-related concepts, such as “homeboy” or “minority.”254 Another 
study observed that white store employees were more likely to monitor 
and follow black (as opposed to white) customers who asked to try on 
sunglasses with a security sensor removed.255 
Additionally, researchers have conducted many deadly force 
simulations in which subjects must decide quickly whether to shoot or 
not shoot figures appearing on a screen who are carrying either a gun or 
an innocuous object (such as a wallet). Whites have been shown to 
                                                     
248. “Priming” occurs when a subject is shown an image or word so quickly that the image or 
word is not registered in consciousness, but nevertheless has a subconscious impact and affects 
behavior. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 880 (2004); Erin J. Strahan et al., Subliminal Priming and 
Persuasion: Striking While the Iron Is Hot, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 556, 556 (2001). 
This is a common and accepted method of investigating underlying mental processes in the field of 
social psychology. 
249. Eberhardt et al., supra note 248, at 882–83. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 885–87. 
252. Id. at 889. 
253. Graham & Lowery, supra note 17, at 487–88, 494, 499. 
254. Id. at 489, 491–97. 
255. George E. Schreer et al., “Shopping While Black”: Examining Racial Discrimination in a 
Retail Setting, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1432, 1439 (2009). 
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commit more errors regarding black (as opposed to white) target 
figures.256 Another such deadly force study was conducted at the 
University of Washington with similar results.257 This bias effect 
increased in one study when subjects read newspaper articles involving 
black (as opposed to white) criminals prior to testing—once again 
showing the power of underlying stereotyping.258 
Researchers have also studied whether nonverbal cues used by police 
officers to identify likely suspects, such as eye contact and body 
language, are accurate across races.259 Research has shown that 
minorities—including minorities who have not been engaging in 
criminal activity—disproportionately exhibit many of these nonverbal 
cues (such as pauses in speech or avoidance of eye contact).260 These 
same behaviors also have been shown in foreign language speakers.261 
e.  Determinations of Guilt and Sentencing Likely Are Influenced by 
the Race of Defendants, in Conjunction with Other Extra-Legal 
Factors 
Researchers have conducted some substantial meta-analyses 
regarding mock juror studies involving race. In these studies, subjects 
are provided with trial materials and asked for judgments of guilt and 
sentencing, and defendant race is manipulated. These studies are limited 
in various ways—for example, they generally evaluate individual mock 
jurors, as opposed to mock juries engaged in group decision-making—
but they appear useful nonetheless. 
One meta-analysis focused on sentencing decisions made by white 
mock jurors found a narrow racial bias in sentencing against people of 
color.262 Another meta-analysis evaluated verdict and sentencing 
decisions made by mock jurors (including black mock jurors) in mock 
cases involving minority defendants, finding no significant effect of 
racial bias (although there were apparent effects within particular types 
                                                     
256. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate 
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1325 (2002). 
257. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to 
Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 399–402 (2003). 
258. Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on Decisions to Shoot, 37 EUR. J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1102, 1114 (2007). 
259. Engel & Johnson, supra note 17; Johnson, supra note 17, at 280, 286. 
260. Engel & Johnson, supra note 17, at 612 tbl.3. 
261. Id. at 613. 
262. Sweeney & Haney, supra note 17, at 191–93. 
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of crime).263 A subsequent meta-analysis collected more studies and 
evaluated the effect of out-group bias, including bias by black mock 
jurors against white mock defendants.264 That meta-analysis found a 
“small, but significant” effect of race on mock juror verdict and 
sentencing decisions, which was substantially tempered both by jury 
instructions and use of binary responses regarding guilt (guilty or not 
guilty, as opposed to a scale measuring likelihood of guilt).265 These 
tempering conditions are more realistic and reflective of actual 
courtroom processes, and thus, based on mock juror research to date, the 
effect of racial bias on jury decisions in general appears to be fairly 
insignificant. 
However, subsequent research has shown that race may play a 
significant role in particular types of criminal cases, or when combined 
with other factors. For instance, some studies have found a substantial 
effect of racial bias for crimes stereotypically associated with a 
particular race—for example, relatively higher guilty ratings for whites 
charged with embezzlement or blacks charged with motor vehicle 
theft.266 Another study evaluated the interaction of defendant race, 
socioeconomic status, and attorney race on mock juror evaluations. 
Although no factor was individually significant, the three factors 
combined were highly significant; all else being equal, the Mexican, 
poor defendant with a Mexican attorney was judged guilty by 55% of 
jurors, while the white, rich defendant with a white attorney was judged 
guilty by only 32% of jurors.267 
f.  Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identification Is Substantially Less 
Accurate, and Cross-Racial Lineup Construction Is Less Fair 
The “cross-race bias” eyewitness phenomenon is the finding that 
“[e]yewitnesses are more accurate when identifying members of their 
                                                     
263. Mazzella & Feingold, supra note 17, at 1325. 
264. Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 621 (2005). 
265. Id. at 629. 
266. Randall A. Gordon et al., Perceptions of Blue-Collar and White-Collar Crime: The Effect of 
Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 128 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 191, 195 (2001); Christopher 
S. Jones & Martin F. Kaplan, The Effects of Racially Stereotypical Crimes on Juror Decision-
Making and Information-Processing Strategies, 25 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 5–7, 9 
(2003). 
267. Russ K.E. Espinoza & Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, Defendant and Defense Attorney 
Characteristics and Their Effects on Juror Decision Making and Prejudice Against Mexican 
Americans, 14 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 364, 367–68 tbls.1 & 2 
(2008). 
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own race than members of other races.”268 In a survey of sixty-four 
eminent experts on eyewitness research, 90% agreed that the cross-race 
bias phenomenon is reliable enough to be presented in court.269 Further, 
a comprehensive and well-regarded meta-analysis of studies regarding 
cross-racial eyewitness identification found that cross-racial 
identifications are 1.56 times more likely to be erroneous than same-race 
identifications.270 Considering the important role that eyewitness 
testimony plays in criminal trials, this incongruity is disturbing. 
Similarly, another study found that cross-racial lineup constructions 
(lineups constructed by individuals of a different race than the suspect) 
are likely to be done with less time and attention to detail in selecting 
foils and are therefore less fair.271 
3.  Bias and Outcomes 
Research also demonstrates that bias, whether conscious or 
unconscious, affects behaviors. In one study, résumés were sent to 1250 
employers who had advertised that they were hiring.272 The résumés 
were altered so that some résumés had stereotypically white-sounding 
names while others had stereotypically black-sounding names. Each 
prospective employer received four résumés from the researchers: “an 
average white applicant, an average black applicant, a highly skilled 
white applicant, and a highly skilled black applicant.”273 Much to the 
surprise of the researchers, 
the résumés with white-sounding names triggered 50 percent 
more callbacks than résumés with black-sounding names. 
Furthermore, the researchers found that the high-quality black 
résumés drew no more calls than the average black résumés. 
Highly skilled candidates with white names got more calls than 
average white candidates, but lower-skilled candidates with 
white names got many more callbacks than even highly skilled 
                                                     
268. Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: A 
New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 408 tbl.1 (2001). 
269. Id. at 407, 410. 
270. Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias 
in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 15 (2001). 
271. John C. Brigham & David J. Ready, Own-Race Bias in Lineup Construction, 9 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 415, 422–23 (1985). 
272. Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2005, at W12, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27067-2005Jan21.html. 
273. Id. 
04 - WLR March 2012 Task Force Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2012 11:17 AM 
SEATTLE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
48 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:1 
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW 
 
black applicants.274 
While this study involved fictitious black and white applicants in an 
employment setting, its implications are of significant concern for the 
criminal justice system, where a significant body of research has 
confirmed the presence of bias and disparate outcomes. 
A difficulty remains, though, with connecting bias to behavior to 
particular outcomes. Absent an admission from an officer who was 
motivated by bias, blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans who are 
stopped and searched while driving their cars cannot prove 
discrimination. Yet more blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans are 
searched, even though statistically, those individuals are less likely to be 
in possession of narcotics.275 
Because of the cumulative effect of facially neutral policies that have 
disproportionate impacts, and because of the subtle operation of bias at 
various decision points, a disproportionate number of people of color in 
Washington State find themselves incarcerated or otherwise involved 
with the criminal justice system—a disproportion that cannot be fully 
accounted for by involvement in crime. 
Further, due to the difficulties in proving intent and the limits of 
current antidiscrimination laws,276 many of the solutions to the problem 
of bias in the criminal justice system will have to come from outside of 
the courtroom. The research shows that implicit racial bias is not an 
unavoidable component of human decision-making. Substantial research 
has begun to determine the most effective methods of minimizing such 
bias.277 Implicit-bias research should inform policymaking and training 
within the criminal justice system, albeit with great care and 
consideration.278 
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275. Pickerill et al., supra note 194, at 13 tbl.3. 
276. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in THE CONSTITUTION 
IN 2020, at 94, 94–99 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
277. See, e.g., Sophie Lebrecht et al., Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial 
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race faces decreases bias shown in IAT); Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the 
Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and 
Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803, 804 fig.1 (2001) (concluding 
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278. See, e.g., Dale Larson, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A time comes when silence is betrayal. 
—Martin Luther King, Jr., 1967 
There is a problem in our justice system. 
In this Report, we find that race and racial bias affect outcomes in the 
criminal justice system and matter in ways that are not fair, that increase 
disparity in incarceration rates, that do not advance legitimate public 
safety objectives, and that undermine public confidence in our criminal 
justice system. We have presented evidence of racial and ethnic 
disproportionality and disparities in the criminal justice system. Arrest 
and conviction rates do not correlate precisely with criminal behavior 
rates and cannot serve as a proxy for criminality. Much of the 
disproportionality cannot be explained by legitimate race-neutral factors. 
Put simply, we have found disparity and mistrust. Together, we must 
fix it for the sake of our democracy.  
Our democracy is based on the rule of law and faith in the fairness of 
the justice system. This faith is undermined by disparity and by high-
profile incidents of violence toward people of color by law 
enforcement.279 The problem is not a “people of color” problem. It is our 
problem as a society to address. 
We, the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System, are 
devoted to reducing racial disparity in the justice system. Existence 
would be intolerable were we never to dream. We dream of completely 
eliminating bias in criminal, civil, juvenile, and family law matters. But 
there is a long history of overpromising and underdelivering. We ask 
that you join us with energy and goodwill, so we are not added to this 
list of failures. We prefer the folly of enthusiasm to the indifference of 
wisdom from those who purport to know better. 
We ask that you trust only action because progress happens at the 
level of events, not of words. Please join our effort to address bias in the 
justice system at every level. We have hope because we are united and 
committed to working collaboratively despite our differences. We 
celebrate the efforts of this Task Force to work together to build a 
community based on trust, equality, and respect. 
 
                                                     
7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 230, 241–43 (2001) (suggesting more lineup foils and own-race 
lineup construction in cases of other-race eyewitness identification). 
279. Steve Miletich, SPD Officer Charged with Assault in Videotaped Kicking, SEATTLE TIMES 
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